In this paper, I draw upon the 'post-Kantian' reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel's idea of God has for understanding his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel's 'recognition-theoretic' approach to his theology. Within
Introduction
Hegel scholarship in the Anglophone world has recently witnessed the establishment of new approaches that aim to show the relevance and topicality of a thought that, for a long time, was often considered one of the most abstract, or even lunatic, instances 2 of a philosophical school (Idealism) that was often regarded as incapable of offering any significant contribution to contemporary thought. One of these new approaches is represented by the so-called 'post-Kantian' interpretation of Hegel pioneered by Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard. i At the core of this interpretation is the idea that Hegel's philosophy does not represent a regression to pre-Kantian metaphysics, but rather an extension of Kant's critical philosophy.
ii While such an approach might lead to the conclusion that Hegel's philosophical project is substantially anti-metaphysical, it has been suggested that it is possible to regard Hegel's thought in continuation with the Kantian project and, at the same time, to still consider Hegel's philosophy as maintaining a metaphysical dimension-or, better, as proposing a different kind of metaphysics: an idealist metaphysics.
To understand how this interpretation is possible, one has to consider that Kant's use of the term 'metaphysics' was ambiguous. Traditionally, the Critique of Pure
Reason has been interpreted as representing a radical scepticism about metaphysics.
Metaphysics is 'the science of illusion' because it has the intention of providing knowledge about objects (such as the soul, or God), of which, no empirical (i.e., spatio-temporal) intuitions are possible. There is no doubt that most of the Critique of Pure Reason pursues this path. Sometimes, however, Kant seems to suggest that metaphysics is somehow possible-not the traditional (pre-Kantian) metaphysics that treated metaphysical objects as if they were natural objects, but a new (idealist) metaphysics, conceived as that discipline in which reason is concerned with its own products.
iii The possibility of reading Kant's account of metaphysics in two different ways has been suggested by Sebastian Gardner (who distinguishes between an "analytic" and an "idealist" way of interpreting the Critique of Pure Reason) iv . This interpretation was articulated more fully by Paul Redding (who calls the two viewpoints 'weak transcendental idealism' and 'strong transcendental idealism', respectively). v A meaningful example is represented by the ideas of the human soul and of God. Whereas pre-Kantian metaphysics dealt with the human soul and God as if they were natural objects, Kant approached them as products of reasons that hold a peculiar regulative status, that is, as regulative principles that 'serve to lead the understanding by means of reason in regard to experience and to the use of its rules in the greatest perfection '. vi In other words, in light of Kant's 'strong transcendental idealism', the existence of the objects of metaphysics is different from the existence 3 of natural objects-that is, metaphysical objects have an ideal rather than a 'naturalistic' existence.
If this is the case, then it is possible to read Hegel's thought as a development of Kant's critical philosophy and in continuity with his project-or at least with one of the possible interpretations of his project, one that Kant himself advanced: 'strong transcendental idealism'. 'Read as an "absolute" idealist in a post-Kantian sense', Redding writes, 'Hegel might be seen as extending such a non-realist approach to both the individual soul and to God'. vii In other words, Hegel is regarded as conceiving of the content of metaphysics as entirely normative rather than as a type of 'scientific' or 'naturalistic' knowledge about the way the world is 'anyway'. From this point of view, Hegel's idealist metaphysics should be conceived as that 'realm of reason' whose objects (e.g., values and norms) exist qua products of reason. Clearly, a problematic aspect of such an approach might be represented by the question of what criterion should be used to determine which objects belong or do not belong to that Furthermore, I suggest that once the kenotic aspect of the Hegelian notion of sacrifice has been made clear, it becomes easier to explain the emphasis that Hegel places on the incarnation of Christ (Section 2). Finally, I claim that Hegel's particular view of kenotic sacrifice, conceived as the key element of Christ's incarnation, sheds light on how his metaphysics is to be interpreted, and I claim that the organising principle of an idealist metaphysics is the reciprocal recognition of different finite points of view.
The conclusion will also provide a possible solution to the dispute between 'left Hegelians' and 'right Hegelians' concerning the status of the idea of God in Hegel's philosophy.
Sacrifice, Kenosis, and Recognition
There is little or no evidence in previous literature of a connection between recognition and sacrifice. This is partly because the interpretative standpoint that emphasises the importance of recognition for Hegel's philosophy has not yet addressed Hegel's philosophy of religion. This lack is probably also due to the influence of Georges Bataille's essay 'Hegel, The third and highest form within the cultus is when one lays aside one's own subjectivity -not only practices renunciation in external things such as possessions, but offers one's heart or inmost self to God and senses remorse and repentance in this inmost self; then one is conscious of one's own immediate natural state (which subsists in the passions and intentions of particularity), so that one dismisses these things, purifies one's heart, and through this purification of one's heart raises oneself up to the realm of the purely spiritual. This experience of What happens when sacrifice is interiorised? First, sacrifice becomes self-sacrifice (Aufopferung), not in the form of self-suppression or self-mortification, but as an offering of the 'inmost self'. When one 'lays aside one's own subjectivity', she senses 'remorse and repentance'. As we know from The Philosophy of Right, subjectivity is, for Hegel, 'a one-sided form' and 'pure certitude of itself in contrast with the truth' (PR §25): it is a (false) presumption of objectivity. xv In the previous state, there was no distinction between subjectivity and objectivity: in the external sacrifice, the relation with the divine is immediate, and the subject is concerned only with his purported achievement (satisfaction of needs, gods' benevolence, etc.). xvi Once the 7 subject has given up her own subjectivity, she becomes conscious of her finiteness (her 'nothingness' in relation to the divine) and dismisses her passions and intentions.
If this is not a one-time experience, but a recurring and cultivated habit, then it becomes the condition for the emergence of a proper ethical life, and the foundation of metaphysical knowledge ('consciousness of the true, of the divine, of God').
The interiorised sacrifice has, therefore, several implications for Hegel's conception of metaphysics, some of which will be sketched in the final section. For now, I would like to stress that the main distinction between external sacrifice and interiorised sacrifice consists in this: external sacrifice is suppressive ('the abstractly negative'); conversely, interiorised sacrifice is kenotic. The term 'kenotic' derives from the Greek word kenosis, meaning 'emptiness'. xvii The use of the term in connection with a 'sacrificial' dynamic (but different from the traditional 'suppressive' meaning of sacrifice) dates back to the Christian New Testament, in particular Philippians 2:7, where, to describe the incarnation of Christ, it is said that Christ 'withdrew' or 'emptied himself' (ekenosen). In the previous verse (Philippians 2:6), it is written that Christ did not consider his divine form (morphe) as something 'to be grasped' or 'to be kept', but was willing to 'empty' or 'annul' himself to assume a different 'form'. What is implied is that God gave up those divine privileges that are incompatible with the finite nature of a human being (omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, etc.) to become fully human. Retrospectively, and through a connection with the Jewish Kabbalistic notion of tsimtsum, xviii the term kenosis has also been used by some theologians to describe God's original act of creation: God created the universe by voluntarily limiting his divine infinity, by withdrawing, and making room for the universe and finite beings. The death of Christ is therefore the highest expression of this kenotic sacrifice, as it
shows that God has indeed withdrawn from his absoluteness and has fully accepted human nature-he has accepted it until death. Hegel writes: '"To sacrifice" means to sublate the natural, to sublate otherness. It is said: "Christ has died for all". This is not a single act but the eternal divine history: it is a moment in the nature of God himself:
it has taken place in God himself" (LPR 470). The sacrifice of Christ is not merely 'a single act', but it shows that the Christian God is not an immutable, always already actualised being; conversely, he is a 'being in becoming'. It has been said that recognition is the organising principle of that 'realm of reason' in which the human normative and cultural world consists. Because the incarnation of Christ is the representation of the kenotic sacrifice, which in turns makes recognition possible, the rise of this idea (in the form of religious narrative) in that same realm of reason really is a turning point in the history of spirit, a turning point that hence sheds light on how metaphysics (conceived as that discipline concerned with the realm of reason) is to be interpreted. Therefore, the last section of this paper will be devoted to an examination of some of the consequences that the idea of God, as presented in
Hegel's philosophy of religion, has for an idealist metaphysics.
Beyond the Split of Right and Left Hegelians: The Idea of God and Hegel's Idealist Metaphysics
Read as an idealist in a post-Kantian sense, Hegel may be seen as conceiving of metaphysics as the discipline in which reason is concerned with its own products.
Hence, God, qua object of metaphysics, should be regarded as having an ideal existence. It follows that the status assigned to the idea of God might be indicative of the way in which an idealist should deal with objects of metaphysics generally.
Moreover, the idea of God is not merely a product of reason among many others, as it plays a very peculiar role. Religious belief systems are, for Hegel, to be understood as non-conceptual presentations of a content that is conceptually presented in philosophy. Therefore, just as a proper understanding of Hegel's metaphysical view is relevant for appreciating his conception of the nature of religious experience and representation, so too his particular views about the incarnation of Christ and the kenotic sacrifice shed light on how his metaphysics is to be interpreted. In Hegel's own words, 'Philosophy is only explicating itself when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion' (LPR 78-79).
In Western thought, the picture of God has always been indicative of the knowledge aspired to in philosophy. For instance, the Aristotelian God, the immutable and fully actualised 'unmoved mover' ('thought thinking itself') was consists in the dismissal of subjectivity. As already mentioned, subjectivity is nothing else but the false presumption of objectivity ('pure certitude of itself in contrast with the truth', PR §25), and this is precisely what has to be given up to gain real metaphysical knowledge.
The idea of God, as it is presented in Hegel's philosophy of religion, is the image of an idealistic standpoint in the domain of epistemology and metaphysics. It also has a peculiar normative value, as it appears from Hegel's appeal to the tradition of Imitatio Christi, and therefore it has an ethical significance: human subjects are required to imitate Christ in his sacrifice / withdrawal. Does this mean that the function of the idea of God in Hegel's philosophy is merely that of an epistemological and ethical metaphor?
This question is anything but new, as it was at the root of the split that developed between the so-called 'right Hegelians' and 'left Hegelians' after Hegel's death. As is known, the right Hegelians, representing the theist faction of Hegel's followers, considered Hegel a realist concerning God. This position was clearly mistaken, as
Hegel was an idealist concerning God. Thus, the left Hegelians (such as Strauss and Feuerbach) were correct in their opposition to the theistic reading of Hegel. However, they were wrong in turning Hegel's thought into a 'humanist' critique of theism. Kant's account of the categorical imperative implies a repeated insistence that moral commands should be listened to as if they were spoken by the voice of God.
That is, the categorical imperative should be regarded as a duty toward God. xlii Kant's insistence represents an attempt to solve the paradox that, according to Terry Pinkard, is implied in the Kantian idea of self-legislation (the idea that one has to be bound by laws of which one is also the author). represented by it) is personal and subject to finitude, but it is not thereby exclusively subjective, and it does not relinquish its universality. In Hegel's view, psychological subjects ('subjective spirits') are embodied within forms of finite life that are shaped by normative and action-guiding narratives that carry strong affective charges. These narratives constitute religion. Conceived in this way, religious narratives and notions regulate the interaction of subjects, and they contribute to those core commitments that are constitutive of moral identity. In this context, the notion of kenotic sacrifice plays a hidden and yet fundamental role. Expressed by the incarnation and the death of Christ, the kenotic sacrifice significantly shapes both modern moral identity and modern post-Kantian metaphysics. Sacrifice as withdrawal (giving up something of one's own identity to make room for other points of view and perspectives) is significant not only because of its capacity to express a philosophical concept (mutual recognition) in an emotionally affecting and motivating representation, it also necessitates a historically-located will to realise and improve a (potentially universal)
recognitively-based structure of norms and values. This will has a significant impact on the development of a post-Kantian and idealist philosophy. xi To date, interpretations of Hegel's writings on theology and religion have assumed that his systematic thought concerning 'spirit' is metaphysically realist. While some interpreters, such as Jaeschke (1990) and Hodgson (2005) , stress the rationalist dimension of Hegel's view on religion, and other interpreters, such as O'Regan (1994) , stress the mystical features of Hegel's thought, the basic shared assumption is that Hegel was essentially a realist about God.
xii Bataille 1955 Bataille /1990 . sacrificial expenditure. However, Bataille himself recognises that the overall goal of the ritual is a manifestation of power by a family or a tribe, so that he eventually admits that 'the ideal would be that a potlatch could not be repaid' (Bataille 1993: 70) .
xv For Hegel 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' are relative rather than absolute terms: 'It is ordinarily supposed that subjective and objective are blank opposites; but this is not the case. Rather they pass into one another, for they are not abstract aspects like positive and negative, but have already a concrete significance' (PR §26a).
xvi In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel refers to this notion, or phase, of subjectivity as 'particularity of will, as caprice with its accidental content of pleasurable ends' (PR §25).
xvii From the Greek verb κενόω, which literally means 'to empty'. In an extended sense, it means 'to make ineffective'.
xviii Literally, 'retraction'. Tsimtsum is a term used in the Kabbalistic teaching of Isaac Luria, a Jewish mystic of the sixteenth century. Tsimtsum is the first act of God: it is the retraction of his light from a certain space so as to reduce its intensity and allow created beings to exist.
xix German theologian Jürgen Moltmann, explaining the kenotic view of creation, writes the following:
'God "withdraws himself from himself to himself" to make creation possible. His creative activity outwards is preceded by this humble divine self-restriction. In this sense God's self-humiliation does not begin merely with creation, inasmuch as God commits himself to this world: it begins beforehand, and is the presupposition that makes creation possible. God's creative love is grounded in his humble, self-humiliating love. This self-restricting love is the beginning of that self-emptying of God that Philippians 2 sees as the divine mystery of the Messiah. Even to create heaven and earth, God emptied himself of all his all-plenishing omnipotence, and as Creator took upon himself the form of a servant'. (Moltmann 1985: 88) . For an introduction to the employment of the notion of kenosis in connection with God's creation, see Polkinghorne 2001.
xx One of Eckhart's most peculiar doctrines concerns the notion of Abgeschiedenheit. This term, usually translated as 'disinterestedness' or 'detachment' in English, effectively refers to the kenotic emptying of the self as a result of the imitation of Christ: 'In Eckhart is found a profound mystical understanding of this twofold kenosis: the one occurs in the bullitio, the "boiling over," of the Trinity from the nothingness of the desert and in which the Father pours the totality of his divinity into the Son; the other occurs in the ebullitio, "flowing out," of the Trinity towards creation, and the Son's selfemptying of his divinity for the sake of the world'. Lanzetta 1992: 260.
xxi Cf. Weeks 1991: 2-3.
xxii Eckhart remained consistent, in this respect, with Thomas Aquinas' conception of a perfect and immutable God, which basically replicated the Aristotelian conception of God as 'unmoved mover'.
